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A B S T R A C T 
There are several theoretical accounts of public sector outsourcing. We note that leading theories give 
different predictions of the influence of political variables and test the predictions on a Swedish data 
set in which outsourcing varies between municipalities and over time as well as between services. Our 
identification strategy focuses on two services with similar contracting problems and local market 
conditions: preschools and primary schools. We study a period in which Swedish municipalities had 
full  discretion  in  the  provision  of  preschools,  while  their  influence  on  the  provision  of  primary 
education  was  limited  by  a  national  voucher  system.  The  comparison  of  preschools  and  primary 
schools in a difference-in-differences model suggests that the political color of the ruling majority 
matters  for  outsourcing,  which  is  consistent  with  the  citizen  candidate  model  of  representative 
democracy.  
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1. Introduction 
The last 30 years have witnessed an intensive, ideologically charged debate over the use of 
private contractors for publicly funded services such as education and health care. With this in mind, it 
is notable that many social scientists have preferred to use the pursuit of economic efficiency to 
explain government outsourcing. Building on Coase (1937), Williamson (1981, 1985) and Grossman 
and Hart (1986), the Transaction cost model of Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) explains outsourcing 
by the contracting difficulties of different services.  
Other models of government outsourcing or of policymaking in general have more of a political 
flavor and assume that politicians are motivated by holding office or by influencing policy. The 
Patronage model of government outsourcing (Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) and the 
Downsian model of electoral competition (Downs 1957) have office motivated politicians. Politicians 
who are motivated by policy are to be found in the Citizen candidate model of Osborne and Slivinsky 
(1996) and Besley and Coate (1997). 
According to the Patronage model, politicians derive significant benefits from in-house 
provision, including support from public employee unions and the ability to control unemployment 
through public payrolls. The cost of patronage is that it has to be paid for by higher taxes, which is 
something voters generally dislike. The Patronage model predicts that politicians will choose lower 
levels of outsourcing than voters prefer, but that this difference will be smaller in competitive 
elections. As is well known, the Downsian model predicts policy convergence even if the competing 
politicians prefer different policies. The policy outcome is determined by the preferences of the 
median voter. In the Citizen candidate model, politicians are motivated to run for office by the 
prospect of implementing their own preferred policy. Unlike the Downsian model, policies are 
expected to diverge such that outsourcing – like other political choices – depends on the identity of the 
winning side in elections.    
Previous empirical studies have arrived at varying conclusions. Based on a literature review and 
some meta-regressions, Bel and Fageda (2007, 2009) conclude that a general explanation of local 
government outsourcing has been hard to find. In any case, local outsourcing seems to be guided by 
pragmatic cost considerations rather than ideological motivations. If anywhere, ideology seems to 
matter in Europe and in large cities. Studies that report that political preferences are unrelated to 
outsourcing include McGuire, Ohsfeldt and van Cott (1987), Dijkgraaf, Gradus and Melenberg (2003), 
and Zullo (2009). Bhatti, Olsen, and Pedersen (2009) on the other hand report that Danish 
municipalities with a conservative or liberal majority utilize contracting more than municipalities with 
majorities to the left in politics. Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) find that the Patronage 
model explains outsourcing in U.S. counties. Brown and Potosky (2003) and Levin and Tadelis (2010) 
instead present evidence from local governments in the United States that supports the Transaction 
cost model of public sector outsourcing. When it comes to Sweden, Ohlsson (2003) finds that cost 3 
 
differences did not affect outsourcing decisions of refuse collection in the municipalities, suggesting 
that policy makers did not minimize costs. 
Unlike the previous empirical studies of public sector outsourcing we test different theories in a 
coordinated fashion. Instead of a large battery of explanatory variables from different theories, we 
focus on two political variables that give different predictions, according to four influential theories. 
The Transaction cost, the Patronage, and the Downsian model do not predict the color of the ruling 
majority to have any effect on outsourcing. The Citizen candidate model on the other hand predicts 
that right majorities will opt for higher levels of outsourcing than left majorities. The four theoretical 
models also differ in their predictions when it comes to the effect of the preferences of the electorate, 
which we measure by vote shares for the right bloc of parties. 
We make use of data on outsourcing in Swedish municipalities. For several reasons, Swedish 
municipalities provide a suitable testing ground for the models that we have described. First, we have 
data in which government outsourcing varies between publicly financed services and between 
municipalities, as well as over time. The data contain information on the outsourcing shares of several 
services in 290 municipalities from 1998 to 2006. This is a considerable improvement compared with 
previous studies, which have either lacked the time dimension or have been limited to a single service 
(e.g., garbage collection).
1 
Second, Sweden has witnessed an ideological realignment in which the number of 
municipalities governed by right parties has increased considerably since around 1990. It is quite 
suggestive that this trend coincides with a steady increase in local government outsourcing. The 
Transaction costs model predicts that outsourcing will differ between services rather than between 
municipalities (for the same service) or over time. Thus, the Transaction costs model can neither 
account for the observed general increase in outsourcing nor for the fact that outsourcing varies widely 
between municipalities.
2  
Third, we are able to test the models with a difference-in differences strategy, making use both 
of similarities and differences between preschools and primary schools. Preschools and primary 
schools are similar services when it comes to contracting difficulties and local market conditions. 
However, the legislative treatment of these two services has differed considerably. The provision of 
preschools was fully determined by municipal discretion between 1992 and 2006. During the same 
period, a voucher system effectively limited the influence of local politicians on the mix between 
                                                 
1 Using cost shares of outsourcing is also an improvement compared with most of the studies in the literature 
which are conducted within a discrete choice framework. For example Brown and Potoski (2003) and Levin and 
Tadelis (2010) both use dummy dependent variables for mode of production (partly or fully contracted out).  
2 Since the savings from outsourcing  seems to be quite large when the public sector is first opened up for 
competition (Andersson and Jordahl 2011), the fact that a lot of  municipalities produce several services fully in-
house is another shortcoming of the transaction costs model.    4 
 
public and private primary schools. The municipality has to finance private schools that meet national 
requirements and attract pupils. We test how the political color of the local majority and the 
outsourcing preferences of the electorate influence differences in outsourcing between preschools and 
primary education.  
We find that political preferences matter for the choice between outsourcing and in-house 
production in Swedish municipalities. This finding appears both as a general visual pattern in our data 
and in econometric tests where we address selection problems by making use of the similar service 
characteristics and different legal regulations of preschools and primary schools. The presented 
evidence is consistent with the Citizen candidate model. Other economic and political models (the 
Transaction cost, the Patronage, and the Downsian model) are inconsistent both with the general 
development of outsourcing in the Swedish public sector and with our econometric estimates.  
The paper proceeds by a description of the context of the empirical analysis, followed by section 
3, in which we provide a picture of the trends and patterns in the data. Section 4 describes how we deal 
with some empirical problems, including selection issues, and section 5 clarifies the theoretical 
predictions in terms of estimated parameters. Section 6 presents the results of the formal tests of the 
models. Finally, section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Local politics and publicly provided services in Sweden 
Sweden is a welfare state characterized by high taxes, generous benefits, and a large public 
sector. The public sector is organized into three levels: municipalities, counties and the national level. 
The 290 municipalities are entrusted with a constitutional right of self-governance, including levying 
income taxes and deciding on local public spending. The municipalities are required by legislation to 
provide child care and early childhood education, primary and secondary education, elderly care, and 
some other services. Health care is mainly provided at the county level. In 2006, total municipal 
expenditure made up 29 percent of total public sector expenditure and 15 percent of GDP.
3 A large 
share of the total costs of the municipalities (69 percent) is made up by the three services elderly care 
(30 percent), primary and secondary education (26 percent), and preschools (13 percent). 
For our purposes, it is important that municipalities are in general free to decide whether they 
should produce a service in-house by municipal employees or to provide the service through outside 
contractors. For primary education, however, there is a voucher system with free entry for private 
providers that meet national requirements. The municipality has to finance private providers that meets 
these requirements and attracts pupils. For preschools, the municipalities were free to decide between 
in-house production and contracting out between 1992 and 2006. Since then, the system is similar to 
that for primary education with free entry for private providers. Since we make use of this institutional 
                                                 
3 Statistics Sweden, Public Finances in Sweden 2008. 5 
 
difference between preschools and primary education, we briefly describe the rules and regulations 
governing these two municipal services below. 
Primary education 
Before 1992, pupils had to attend the public school in their local area. In 1992, a reform was 
implemented that allowed parents and pupils to choose a private school and required the municipalities 
to pay private schools for each pupil at a rate corresponding to 85 percent of the average expenditure 
in the public schools in the same municipality. The guiding principle behind the reform is that public 
and private schools should compete on equal terms. All schools have to follow the national 
curriculum. The private schools are not allowed to charge fees (including top-up fees) or to select 
pupils by ability, socio-economic characteristics or ethnicity.
4 The proportion of pupils in private 
schools has grown steadily since 1992. In 2006, 8 percent of all pupils in primary education (and 15 
percent of all pupils in secondary education) were enrolled in private schools.
5 The urbanized areas of 
south and middle Sweden (the Greater Stockholm area in particular) have the highest concentration of 
pupils in private schools.  
Preschools 
The municipalities are also legally required to provide preschools and school-age child care for 
children between the age of 1 and 12, allowing parents to work or study. In 2006, 79 percent of 
children between the age of 1 and 5 were enrolled in municipally financed preschools: 83 percent in 
municipal and 17 percent in private units. There were private preschools in 80 percent of the 
municipalities.
6 The most popular private preschools are for-profit companies and parents’ 
cooperatives (with 37 and 32 percent of the children in non-municipal preschools respectively).
7   
Preschools are heavily subsidized by the municipalities and the subsidies have, since the 1980s, 
been made more accessible to private providers. This stepwise process started in 1984 when parents’ 
cooperatives and day-care centers with special forms of pedagogy were allowed to receive municipal 
subsidies. Subsidies to for-profit companies were introduced in 1992. Until 2006, the municipalities 
made discretionary decisions in each individual case, but since 2006, they have to grant subsidies to 
non-municipal preschools and leisure time centers that meet national standards.  
                                                 
4 See Böhlmark and Lindahl (2008) for a description of the 1992 reform. 
5 Statistics Sweden, Utbildningsstatistisk årsbok 2008 [Yearbook of Educational Statistics 2008], p. 76. 
6 Swedish National Agency for Education,  
http://www.skolverket.se/content/1/c4/92/23/BO_Barn%20och%20grupper_Riksniv%E5_Tabell1A.xls 
(accessed June 17, 2011). 
7 Swedish National Agency for Education,  
http://www.skolverket.se/content/1/c4/92/23/F%F6rskola_Barn%20och%20grupper_Riksniv%E5_Tabell4.xls 6 
 
Local politics in Sweden 
Politically, Sweden is often treated as a fairly stable two-bloc system even though the electoral 
system is proportional.
8 The left bloc includes the Left Party, the Social Democratic Party. The right 
bloc includes the Moderate Party the Center Party, the Liberal Party, and the Christian Democrats. The 
Green Party has mostly been positioned outside of the two blocs. Elections are held every fourth year 
and the election day is fixed to the third Sunday of September. During our sample period, elections 
were held in 1998, 2002 and 2006. There is no minimum threshold for winning seats in the municipal 
councils and a number of small, local parties are represented in some of the municipal councils 
without holding seats in parliament.
9 When a small local party or the Green Party holds the balance of 
power in a municipality, it is difficult to classify the majority as either left or right and we treat such 
cases as undefined. Table 1 gives the frequency of different types of coalitions in the municipalities 
from 1994 to 2006. 
 
Table 1. Coalitions in Swedish municipalities after 1994 – 2006 
 
Election period  Left bloc  
 
Right bloc 
 
Undefined 
(Greens holding balance) 
1994-1998  145  65  78 (30) 
1998-2002  112  93  83 (20) 
2002-2006  108  99  83 (20) 
Notes: When either of the blocs receives more than 50 percent of the seats the majority coalition is classified 
accordingly. When neither of the blocs receives 50 percent of the seats the majority coalition is classified as 
undefined. Cases when either of the blocs would need the support of the Green Party to form a majority are in 
parentheses in the last column. 
 
The classification of Swedish parties – and their voters – as either left or right, reflects an 
ideological divide which is clearly discernible in opinions on privatization and municipal 
outsourcing.
10 Survey data from the SOM Institute demonstrates that in every single year during our 
period of study (1998–2006), citizens who support parties in the right bloc are much more in favor of 
further outsourcing of education, elderly care and health care than citizens who support the left bloc 
parties.
11 The supporters of the Moderate Party are the most positive towards outsourcing and the 
supporters of the Left Party are the most negative. Within the right bloc, the supporters of the Center 
Party do not express as strong support for outsourcing as the supporters of the other three right parties 
                                                 
8 Sweden is classified as a two-bloc, or bipartisan, system in Alesina et al. (1997), Pettersson-Lidbom (2008), as 
well as in several other empirical papers.  
9 At the national level there is a 4 percent threshold for winning seats in parliament. 
10 On the general usefulness of left-right terminology, see Bobbio (1996) and Mair (2007). 
11  Party support is measured annually by the question “Which party do you like best today?” 7 
 
do; still Center Party supporters consistently surpass left bloc supporters in their approval of public 
sector outsourcing.
12  
 
3. Trends and patterns in local government outsourcing 
We have assembled a new data set from Statistics Sweden in which we observe outsourcing of 
several different services in each of Sweden’s 290 municipalities over a nine year period (1998–2006). 
Our data distinguishes outsourcing to private firms, to non-profit organizations and to other units in 
the public sector. Over the considered period, outsourcing made up 13 percent of the costs for public 
services in the average Swedish municipality (of which outsourcing to other public entities constitutes 
45 percent, and outsourcing to private firms and to non-profit associations constitute 35 and 10 percent 
respectively. 
As a starting point, we demonstrate a fundamental weakness with economic explanations of 
public sector outsourcing. If transaction costs determine outsourcing, service characteristics should be 
decisive and we should observe little variation between municipalities and over time. However, our 
data show that outsourcing as a share of the costs for municipal services has increased by 30 percent 
from 1998 to 2006.   
While such a trend towards more outsourcing in the public sector does not necessarily contradict 
the Transaction costs model (perhaps in line with the growth of outsourcing and offshoring in the 
business sector), there are several public services – including preschools and primary education – for 
which a substantial reduction of transaction costs seem unlikely. It is rather quite suggestive that the 
trend towards more outsourcing coincides with a political realignment in the municipalities. As 
described in section 2, the right bloc had a majority in 65 municipalities after the 1994 election. After 
the 2002 election, this number had increased to 99. Figure 1 displays the coinciding increase in 
outsourcing and the rise of right majorities in the municipal councils.  
 
 
   
                                                 
12 The SOM surveys are available at The Swedish National Data Service (SND). The data in the SOM  
surveys were originally collected in a research project at the University of Gothenburg, under the guidance of 
Sören Holmberg, Lennart Weibull and Lennart Nilsson. Neither SND nor the primary researchers are responsible 
for the analyses and interpretations presented in this paper. The details of our analyses of the SOM surveys are 
available upon request. 8 
 
Figure 1. Development of outsourcing and political majorities 
 
Notes: Costs for outsourcing as a share of the costs for municipal services on the vertical axis to the left. Share of 
municipalities with a right bloc majority on the vertical axis to the right. 
 
Looking at the cross-section, the use of outsourcing differs considerably between municipalities. 
While the Transaction costs model cannot account for this, the differences seem to follow a political 
pattern. The boxplots in Figure 2 summarize outsourcing in Swedish municipalities in 2006. It is 
evident that municipalities with right majorities are outsourcing more than municipalities with left 
majorities do. The large spread among right municipalities is another notable difference. On the one 
hand, several right municipalities produce all or almost all of the depicted services themselves. On the 
other hand, all of the observations with extremely high values of outsourcing are right municipalities. 
Finally, an unmistakable difference between preschools and primary education is that the 
municipalities are more dispersed for preschools with several very high values of outsourcing in right 
municipalities, whereas the maximum levels for primary education are more similar in left and right 
municipalities. Figure 2 also contains boxplots for elderly care, which – like preschools – is a service 
for which municipalities had discretionary control over outsourcing. Since outsourcing varies 
considerably with political majority for preschools and elderly care but not for primary education, it 
seems likely that the political preferences of the majority coalition influence outsourcing – when 
national legislation allow for this. 
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Figure 2. Outsourcing by political majority 
 
Notes: The boxplots show median (the line in the middle of the box), 1
st quartile, and 3
rd quartile values (the box 
itself; thus with a height of 1 interquartile range (IQR)). Lines called whiskers are drawn between the box and 
the upper and lower adjacent values. The upper adjacent value is defined as the largest data point less than or 
equal to the 75
th percentile + 1.5*IQR and the lower adjacent value is defined as the smallest data point  
greater than or equal to the 25
th percentile - 1.5*IQR. Observations above the upper and below the lower 
adjacent values are plotted as outliers. 
 
Taken together, the trends and patterns of local government outsourcing provide suggestive 
evidence against economic explanations based on transaction costs. Right majorities outsource more – 
some of them at very high levels – indicating that political models of outsourcing may be more 
promising. However, more careful testing is required in order to discriminate between different 
political models.  
 
4. Identification and testing 
As we have seen, the general pattern in the data hints at political factors as determinants of 
outsourcing. In order to go on and formally test the relevance of different models of outsourcing, we 
need to consider several methodological difficulties. First, we need to find proxies for the political 
determinants of outsourcing. Since the influence of political parties mainly depends on whether or not 
they are part of the majority coalition, we use a dummy that equals one if the parties in the right bloc 
hold a majority of the seats in the municipal council. We measure voters’ preferences for outsourcing 
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by the vote share for the parties in the right bloc in the county election in a municipality. Outsourcing 
of health care has since long been one of the dominant issues in county elections (health care amounts 
to 91 percent of total public expenditures at the county level),
13 and support for outsourcing the county 
level service health care is strongly correlated with support for outsourcing the municipal level 
services education and elderly care, according to each of the yearly SOM surveys.
14 The election year 
SOM surveys also show that people who voted for any of the right bloc parties are considerably more 
likely to support further outsourcing of health care, education and elderly care than people who voted 
for a left bloc party. People who voted for a right bloc party in the county election are also marginally 
more likely to support outsourcing of health care and education than people who voted for a right bloc 
party in the municipal election.
15    
Another advantage with a county election measure of political preferences at the municipal level 
is that county elections are not confounded by strategic behavior of the political parties at the 
municipal level. As an example of this problem, the Downsian model of electoral competition predicts 
policy platforms to converge at the ideal point of the median voter, resulting in close municipal 
election results that are not very informative about voter preferences for outsourcing. Although the 
Downsian model predicts county elections to be close too, the model doesn’t say anything about the 
closeness of county election results within single municipalities.
16 
 A second problem is the risk of obtaining biased estimates when regressing outsourcing shares 
on political variables. For instance, the transaction costs of outsourcing can arguably be lower in 
municipalities with a lot of small business owners and a large private sector. Since businessmen and 
private sector employees are typically more likely to vote for a right bloc party, we run the risk of 
falsely concluding that outsourcing that is motivated by transaction costs depends on political 
preferences. The optimal mix of public and private production could also differ between municipalities 
depending on their size, the composition of their population, and other variables that may be correlated 
with political preferences; if omitted, such variables will confound our tests of the different models. 
The traditional solution to the described selection problem is to add controls for all potentially 
confounding variables. But doing so is far from easy: data is not available for all variables and it is 
difficult to know how to correctly specify the model. We address the problem by using a difference-in-
                                                 
13 Statistics Sweden, Public Finances in Sweden 2008, p. 113. 
14 When measuring opinions of outsourcing on a 1–5 scale where 1 is “Very good suggestion” and 5 is “Very 
bad suggestion” the correlation coefficient between health care and education is 0.55–0.69 and the correlation 
coefficient between health care and elderly care is 0.71–0.80 in the 1998–2003 SOM surveys (the surveys in 
which those questions were asked to all respondents). There are no questions about outsourcing of preschools or 
child care in the SOM surveys. 
15 The shares of right party voters who reported that outsourcing is a “Very good suggestion” or a “Rather good 
suggestion” differ by about one percentage point between the county and the municipal elections.  
16 On average each county consists of 13.8 municipalities. 11 
 
differences strategy that relies on the institutional differences between preschools and primary 
education. In particular we estimate different versions of the following general model: 
 
                                                                                                
         
 
Out is a measure of the degree of outsourcing of preschools and primary education. Right is a 
dummy that equals one if the parties in the right bloc hold a majority of the seats in the municipal 
council. Votes measures the share of voters in the municipality who voted for a right party in the 
county election.  Pre is a dummy variable for preschool services. Subscript i, t and s are municipality, 
year and service indicators. We also add the vector X with controls for observable factors that may 
determine outsourcing. Note that we allow the influence of these factors to be different for outsourcing 
of preschools and primary education. Finally, ε is an error term.  
Under the assumption that the influence of the political majority and of voter preferences would 
not differ between outsourcing of preschools and primary education under the same legal framework, 
we obtain unbiased estimates of the effect of our political variables on outsourcing of preschools 
relative to primary education (   and   ); at least conditional on the control function       . This 
approach accounts for unobservables that vary within municipalities over time (due to for example 
local market development or learning effects) as long as the influence of these factors is the same for 
preschools and primary schools. We can account for differences in contracting possibilities between 
services over time, as long as they are equal for all municipalities, by adding year-service fixed effects 
to our model. It could still be the case that the relative contracting possibilities for preschools and 
primary education differ geographically. However, even if we would fail to capture such differences 
with our control variables, we can account for them by adding county-service fixed effects. 
 
5. Political models and empirical parameters 
The four models we want to test give different predictions for the parameters    and   . Before 
we explain the predictions in detail, it is worth repeating that our approach relies on a legal framework 
that gave local politicians discretionary power to decide about outsourcing of preschools, whereas they 
had limited influence over the share of private providers in primary education. Next, we describe four 
different accounts of outsourcing that follow from four relevant theoretical models: the Transaction 
costs model, the Patronage model, the Downsian median voter model, and the Citizen candidate 
model. Table 2 at the end of the section summarizes the predictions of the four models. 12 
 
The Transaction costs model 
As the name indicates the Transaction costs model predicts that the transaction costs of 
outsourcing will determine the make-or-buy-decision. Services with low transaction costs will be 
outsourced, whereas services that are difficult to contract on will be produced in-house. The difficulty 
of contracting, in turn, depends on the difficulty of measuring and monitoring quality, the need for 
flexibility, and the risk that “specific assets” give rise to hold-up problems.
17 An implicit assumption is 
that policy makers maximize social welfare. The political party, ideology, or self-interest of voters and 
politicians are immaterial.  
If this model is correct, we expect:        since the identity of the majority coalition do not 
matter. When it comes to vote shares, we note that the share of primary education that is produced by 
private providers is determined on a quasi-market of school choice. Since parents do not internalize 
full transaction costs (not even in this model), we expect their demand for private schools to be 
correlated with their political preferences.
18 In terms of our empirical specification, we expect   > 0. 
However, the political preferences of the electorate should not influence the outsourcing decision of 
the politicians. We therefore expect          < 0. 
The Patronage model 
In the Patronage model, politicians are motivated by and compete for office. The distinguishing 
feature of the model is that politicians prefer in-house production by public employees. The private 
benefits to politicians of public employment include “the support of local public sector unions, the 
opportunity to purchase supplies from political allies, the ability to hire relatives and campaign 
activists, the ability to use local government employees on political projects, etc” (Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny 1997: 450).
19 Thus, all parties, independently of their political color, prefer in-
house production to outsourcing and we expect         However, voters realize that governments may 
over use public employees and thus oust a government if it is misusing its power. Patronage has to be 
paid for by higher taxes, which is something voters generally dislike. When there is strong political 
competition the government finds it more difficult to satisfy a majority of voters and may need to use 
more outsourcing to reduce taxes. When elections are competitive, voters’ preferences for outsourcing 
can thus be expected to matter for preschools. But since the demand for private schools is probably 
                                                 
17 See Levin and Tadelis (2010) for a comprehensive theoretical account of the Transaction costs model. 
18 The positive association between support for the right bloc of parties and support for further outsourcing of 
education (which we reported in section 2) does not differ much between parents and non-parents. In addition, an 
opinion survey conducted by Demoskop in 2001 reported that 35 percent of parents with children in a private 
school would vote for one of the right bloc parties, whereas the same figure for parents who had chosen a public 
school for their children was 24 percent (Bergmark 2001: 33).    
19 The Patronage model of government outsourcing is similar to the theory developed by Boycko, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1995) on the privatization of state-owned enterprises,   13 
 
also positively correlated with right votes, we cannot expect anything else than         . This logic and 
prediction is the same for the other two political models below (Downsian and Citizen candidate). In 
non-competitive elections, however, voters’ preferences do not matter for outsourcing of preschools 
and we expect         (due to the positive relationship between right votes and primary schools).  
We identify competitive elections as elections in which the right bloc obtains between 45 and 55 
percent of the votes; we set the dummy Competitive equal to one when this is the case. Again, note 
that we measure voters’ preferences for outsourcing by the vote share for the right bloc within a 
municipality in the county election, whereas we measure competitiveness by the same votes share in 
the municipal election.  
To test the Patronage model, we include the dummy Competitive, an interaction between 
Competitive and right votes in the county election (Votes), an interaction between Competitive and the 
preschool dummy (Pre), and finally the interaction between all three variables. The Patronage model 
predicts the parameter of the triple interaction to be negative, since the voters’ preferences for 
outsourcing should only influence outsourcing for preschools when elections are close. 
The Downsian median voter model 
The Downsian model (Downs 1957) shares with the Patronage model the assumption that 
politicians are office motivated. Politicians have to propose the policy preferred by the median voter to 
stand a chance of winning. Thus, the political color of the local majority does not influence policy, and 
we expect            
20 The preference distribution among voters matter, however. As mentioned, 
policy is determined by the preferences of the median voter. Since the median voter’s preferred 
position is likely to be strongly correlated with mean position, we expect a positive relationship of the 
share of votes for right wing parties in the county elections on the outsourcing of preschools.
21 Since 
national legislation effectively lets parents determine the outsourcing of primary education , we expect 
     . Unfortunately, since we expect the share of votes to have a positive, but not necessarily an 
equal, effect both for preschools and for primary education, it is difficult to determine the sign of   . 
The sign depends on how the median voter’s preferences for outsourcing differ from the mean 
parent’s. In general it would be unwarranted to assume any difference without an empirical 
examination of the case. We therefore expect        
The Citizen candidate model 
In the Citizen candidate model of Osborne and Slivinsky (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997), 
politicians are motivated by the chance to implement their own preferred policy. Hence, we expect 
                                                 
20 The probabilistic voting model is similar to the Downsian model in that it predicts convergence, but its focus 
on explaining spending on different groups deviates from our focus in this paper. 
21 Note that it would be problematic to use vote shares from municipal elections to measure voter preferences for 
outsourcing since the model predicts a 50–50 vote split regardless of the distribution of preferences. 14 
 
      , since politicians from parties to the right typically have a preference for more outsourcing 
than left politicians do, and since the model predicts that  two candidates at equidistant points from the 
median voter’s preferred position will run for office – one of whom will win the election. The 
distribution of preferences in the electorate determines the candidates who have sufficient incentives to 
run for office, and hence the policy preferences of the competing candidates. Again, we expect that   
is positive, given that parents who vote for parties to the right are more inclined to choose a private 
school for their children. The sign of    is difficult to predict, but is determined by the same logic as 
for the Downsian model. The distinguishing prediction of the Citizen candidate model is        .  
 
Table 2. Predictions  
   
Model         
Transaction cost  0  <0 
Downs  0   0 
Patronage (Non competitive)  0  <0 
Patronage (Competitive)  0   0 
Citizen candidate  >0  ≈0 
 
 
6. Results 
We now turn to the estimations of the empirical models and the formal testing of the theoretical 
predictions. Table 3 shows the estimates of the parameters with outsourcing to all providers as the 
dependent variable. The specifications in columns 1–3 differ according to whether we include control 
variables that capture differences in economic and demographic structure (see detailed regression 
results in Appendix A and description of variables in Appendix B), year dummies, and county fixed 
effects (all also interacted with the preschool dummy).
22 Column 4 present results from a specification 
that we use to test the Patronage model.
23  
 
   
                                                 
22 Tables A1 and A2 in Appendix A contain all of the estimates including for the control variables. 
23 287 of Sweden’s 290 municipalities are included in the regressions. We exclude two municipalities that were 
founded  during  our  sample  period  (Nykvarn  and  Knivsta).  We  are  also  missing  outsourcing  data  for  one 
municipality (Upplands Väsby).   15 
 
Table 3. Estimates of outsourcing of preschools and primary schools  
Dep. var: Outsourcing (all providers, share of budget) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Right × Pre (βP)  1.603***  1.581***  1.429***  1.389** 
  (0.374)  (0.369)  (0.359)  (0.369) 
Votes × Pre (γP)  0.0233  0.0564**  0.0870***  0.0769*** 
  (0.0217)  (0.0238)  (0.0253)  (0.0259) 
Pre  -45.44***  -42.38***  -39.63***  -37.62*** 
  (7.655)  (7.485)  (8.566)  (8.439) 
Right  0.388*  0.388*  0.112  0.134 
  (0.234)  (0.234)  (0.237)  (0.237) 
Votes   0.0254**  0.0320**  0.00107  0.00176 
  (0.0129)  (0.0137)  (0.0145)  (0.0148) 
Votes × Pre × competitive        -0.0717 
        (0.0458) 
Votes × competitive        0.0881*** 
        (0.0281) 
Competitive × Pre        3.042 
        (2.213) 
Competitive         -3.922*** 
        (1.360) 
Constant  4.891  5.985  12.02**  11.13** 
  (4.670)  (4.764)  (5.384)  (5.372) 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Controls × Pre  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  -  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effect × Pre  -  Yes  Yes  Yes 
County fixed effects      Yes  Yes 
County fixed effects × Pre      Yes  Yes 
Observations  5128  5128  5128  5128 
Municipalities  287  287  287  287 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Notably, the coefficient for Right×Pre (βP) is positive and statistically significant in all 
columns. The interpretation is that municipalities with a right majority are outsourcing relatively more 
of preschools than of primary schools. This result is only consistent with the Citizen candidate model; 
the other models all predicts βP=0. The size of the effect is economically significant, given the 
ideological preferences of the electorate, the average right government is outsourcing about 1.5 
percentage points more of preschools than of primary schools (the average outsourcing share over the 
period is 7.1 both for preschools and primary schools).  
Note that the estimated effects are for a right majority relative to a left or an undefined majority. 
The choice to look at right majorities vs. left and undefined majorities or left vs. right and undefined is 
largely arbitrary. Results for the latter specification is presented in Appendix A, Table A3, and show 
that left majorities are outsourcing less of preschools relative to primary schools. 
The other coefficient of interest, for Votes×Pre (γP), is also positive and statistically significant 
in all but column 1. This is inconsistent with the Transaction costs and Patronage model (in non-
competitive elections), which predict γP<0. The effect of voter preferences for outsourcing appears 
quite weak. A ten percentage point increase in the vote share for the parties in the right bloc – i.e. a 16 
 
very large increase – increases the outsourcing of preschools relative to primary education with only 
0.9 percentage points. 
The specification in column 4 investigates if the relationship between votes and outsourcing 
differs between competitive and non-competitive elections. The Patronage model predicts that this 
relationship should be negative when elections are non-competitive but non-existent when elections 
are competitive. The intuition is that competitive elections discipline politicians so that they have to 
pick similar levels of outsourcing of preschools as parents have themselves demanded for outsourcing 
of primary schools. The estimates in column 4 do not support the view that the competitiveness of 
elections matters for municipal outsourcing.  
  Table 4 contains estimates from specifications where the dependent variable is outsourcing to 
private providers. The estimates are smaller both for Right x Pre (βP) and for Votes x Pre (γP), but 
choices of private outsourcing do not seem to differ markedly from outsourcing choices within the 
public sector. 
 
Table 4. Estimates of outsourcing of preschools and primary schools to private entities 
Dep. Var: Outsourcing (private proviuders, share of budget) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Right × Pre (βP)  0.615**  0.617**  0.572**  0.728*** 
  (0.289)  (0.274)  (0.278)  (0.281) 
Votes × Pre (γP)  0.00266  0.0433**  0.0503**  0.0576** 
  (0.0172)  (0.0192)  (0.0217)  (0.0228) 
Pre  -26.95***  -22.03***  -27.29***  -24.83*** 
  (6.426)  (6.025)  (6.997)  (6.926) 
Right  0.297  0.301*  0.0994  0.134 
  (0.184)  (0.182)  (0.184)  (0.187) 
Votes   0.0163*  0.0212**  0.0149  0.0103 
  (0.00968)  (0.0102)  (0.0114)  (0.0119) 
Votes × Pre × competitive        -24.83*** 
        (6.926) 
Votes × competitive        0.0611** 
        (0.0260) 
Competitive × Pre        1.360 
        (1.769) 
Competitive         -3.050** 
        (1.252) 
Constant  -0.941  0.0713  7.511*  8.071* 
  (7.595)  (7.674)  (4.198)  (4.203) 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Controls × Pre  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  -  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effect × Pre  -  Yes  Yes  Yes 
County fixed effects      Yes  Yes 
County fixed effects × Pre      Yes  Yes 
Observations  5120  5120  5120  5120 
Municipalities  287  287  287  287 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 17 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
The presented evidence is consistent with a political view of government outsourcing as 
outlined in the Citizen candidate model. Other economic and political models (the Transaction cost, 
the Patronage, and the Downsian model) are inconsistent both with the general development of 
outsourcing in the Swedish public sector and with our estimates based on comparisons between 
preschools and primary education. 
Our result stands in contrast to previous studies in other countries, which have mostly concluded 
that political preferences are unrelated to outsourcing 
Although our data (with variation between municipalities and over time as well as between 
services) trumps what have been used previously, data availability and sample size still impose 
limitations on the empirical analysis. As for now and given the data at hand, the political preferences 
of the ruling majority seem to be important in explaining public sector outsourcing.     
   18 
 
References 
Alesina, A., Roubini, N. and G. Cohen, 1997. Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Andersson, F. and H. Jordahl, 2011. Outsourcing public services: Ownership, competition, quality and 
contracting. IFN Working Paper, No. 874. Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN).  
Bel, G. and X. Fageda, 2007. Why do local governments privatise public services? A survey of empirical studies, 
Local Government Studies, 33 (4), 517–534. 
Bel, G. and X. Fageda, 2009. Factors explaining local privatization: a meta-regression analysis. Public Choice, 
139 (1), 105–119. 
Bergmark, K., 2001. Föräldrar med barn i friskola och kommunal skola. Svenskt Näringsliv. 
Bhatti, Y., A Olsen, and L. Pedersen, 2009. The effects of administrative professionals on contracting out. 
Governance, 22 (1), 121–137.  
Bobbio, N., 1996. Left & Right: The Significance of a Political Distinction. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. 
Besley, T. and S. Coate, 1997. An economic model of representative democracy. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 112 (1), 85–114. 
Böhlmark, A. and M. Lindahl, 2008. Does school privatization improve educational achievement? Evidence 
from Sweden's voucher reform. IZA Discussion Paper No. 3691. 
Boycko, M., A. Shleifer and R. Vishny, 1996. A theory of privatisation. Economic Journal, 106 (435), 309–319. 
Brown, T. and M. Potoski, 2003. The influence of transactions costs on municipal and county government 
choices of alternative modes of service provision. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 
13(4), 441–468. 
Coase, R., 1937. The nature of the firm. Econometrica, 4, 386–405.   
Dijkgraaf, E., R. H. J. M. Gradus & B. Melenberg, 2003. Contracting out refuse collection. Empirical 
Economics, 28 (3), 553–570. 
Downs, A., 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row Publishers. 
Grossman, S. and O. Hart, 1986. The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory of vertical and lateral 
integration. Journal of Political Economy, 94 (4), 691–719. 
Hart, O., A. Shleifer and R. Vishny, 1997. The proper scope of government: Theory and an application to 
prisons. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112 (4), 1127–1161. 
Levin, J. and S. Tadelis, 2010. Contracting for government services: Theory and evidence from U.S. cities. 
Journal of Industrial Economics, 58 (3), 507–541. 
Lopez-de-Silanes, F., A. Shleifer and R. Vishny, 1997. Privatization in the United States. Rand Journal of 
Economics 28, 447–71. 
Mair, P., 2007. Left-right orientations. In R. Dalton and H-D Klingemann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
Political Behavior. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 19 
 
McGuire, R., R. Ohsfeldt, and N. van Cott, 1987. The determinants of the choice between public and private 
production of a publicly funded service. Public Choice, 54 (3), 211–230.  
Ohlsson, H., 2003. Ownership and production costs. Choosing between public production and contracting-out in 
the case of Swedish refuse collection. Fiscal Studies, 24, 451–476. 
Osborne, M. and A. Slivinski, 1996. A model of political competition with citizen-candidates. Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 111 (1), 65–96. 
Pettersson-Lidbom, P., 2008. Do parties matter for economic outcomes? A regression-discontinuity approach. 
Journal of the European Economic Association, 6 (5), 1037–1056. 
Statistics Sweden, 2009. Public Finances in Sweden 2009. 
Swedish National Agency for Education, 2006. Descriptive data on pre-school activities, school-age childcare, 
schools and adult education in Sweden 2006. Swedish National Agency for Education report no. 283. 
Williamson, O., 1981. The economics of organization. American Journal of Sociology, 87, 548–577. 
Williamson, O., 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: Free Press. 
Zullo, R., 2009. Does fiscal stress induce privatization? Correlates of private and intermunicipal contracting, 
1992–2002. Governance, 22 (3), 459–481.    20 
 
Appendix A. Detailed and additional regression results 
Table A1. Detailed estimates of outsourcing of primary education and preschools 
Dep. Var: Outsourcing (all providers, share of budget) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Right x PS (βP)  1.603**  1.581**  1.429**  1.389*** 
  (0.693)  (0.697)  (0.673)  (0.369) 
Votes x PS  0.0233  0.0564**  0.0870***  0.0769*** 
  (0.0422)  (0.0453)  (0.0485)  (0.0259) 
PS  -45.44***  -42.38***  -39.63***  -37.62*** 
  (15.94)  (15.81)  (18.84)  (8.439) 
Right  0.388*  0.388*  0.112  0.134 
  (0.529)  (0.530)  (0.500)  (0.237) 
Votes  0.0254**  0.0320**  0.00107  0.00176 
  (0.0293)  (0.0317)  (0.0314)  (0.0148) 
Votes x PS x competitive        -0.0717 
        (0.0458) 
Votes x competitive        0.0881*** 
        (0.0281) 
Competitive x PS        3.042 
        (2.213) 
Competitive         -3.922*** 
        (1.360) 
Employment  -0.229***  -0.247***  -0.279***  -0.297*** 
  (0.0592)  (0.0620)  (0.0678)  (0.0677) 
Business employment  0.0528***  0.0591***  0.0701***  0.0676*** 
  (1.213)  (1.244)  (1.229)  (1.242) 
Tax base  0.0926***  0.121***  0.0288  0.0654*** 
  (0.00881)  (0.0170)  (0.0186)  (0.0181) 
Municipal net profit/loss  1.33e-05  2.07e-05  2.46e-05  3.18e-05 
  (4.26e-05)  (4.29e-05)  (3.50e-05)  (3.49e-05) 
Grants  0.000277***  0.000354***  0.000294***  0.000396*** 
  (3.21e-05)  (4.23e-05)  (5.69e-05)  (5.87e-05) 
University education (3>= years)  0.305***  0.261***  0.434***  0.357*** 
  (0.0598)  (0.0655)  (0.0643)  (0.0626) 
Preschool children (<7 years, percent)  -0.112  -0.264  -0.611***  -0.438** 
  (0.146)  (0.191)  (0.192)  (0.183) 
School age children (7 to 16, percent)  -0.0318  -0.105  0.0868  -0.124 
  (0.126)  (0.143)  (0.131)  (0.126) 
Old (>=65 years)  -0.285***  -0.366***  -0.265***  -0.315*** 
  (0.0761)  (0.0832)  (0.0886)  (0.0878) 
Foreign citizens  0.0503  0.0317  -0.104***  -0.116*** 
  (0.0377)  (0.0382)  (0.0399)  (0.0406) 
On welfare  -0.0223  -0.0583  -0.258***  -0.257*** 
  (0.0813)  (0.0820)  (0.0847)  (0.0851) 
Interactions with preschool dummy         
         
Employment  -0.0104  -0.0751  0.0440  0.0692 
  (0.0978)  (0.105)  (0.122)  (0.117) 
Business employment  0.0496**  0.0657***  0.0565**  0.0616** 
  (2.220)  (2.363)  (2.636)  (2.627) 
Tax base  -0.0222  0.0779**  0.0452  -0.0244 
  (0.0156)  (0.0368)  (0.0379)  (0.0151) 
Municipal profit/loss  -3.62e-05  -8.99e-06  -4.29e-05  -5.57e-05 
  (6.73e-05)  (6.71e-05)  (6.13e-05)  (6.03e-05) 
Grants  -0.000217***  6.15e-05  -0.000175*  -0.000376*** 
  (6.02e-05)  (7.25e-05)  (9.60e-05)  (7.47e-05) 
University education (3>= years)  0.864***  0.628***  0.517***  0.672*** 
  (0.101)  (0.100)  (0.103)  (0.0975) 
Preschool children (<7 years, percent)  2.122***  2.112***  2.038***  1.681*** 
  (0.259)  (0.320)  (0.322)  (0.251) 
School age children (7 to 16, percent)  0.682***  0.113  0.215  0.651*** 
  (0.210)  (0.221)  (0.217)  (0.194) 
Old (>=65 years)  0.718***  0.472***  0.650***  0.750*** 
  (0.128)  (0.125)  (0.137)  (0.130) 
Foreign citizens  0.0277  -0.0615  -0.0558  -0.0302 
  (0.0551)  (0.0570)  (0.0712)  (0.0702) 
On welfare  0.414***  0.334***  0.491***  0.489*** 
  (0.123)  (0.122)  (0.137)  (0.135) 
Constant  4.891  5.985  12.02**  11.13** 
  (4.670)  (4.764)  (5.384)  (5.372) 
Year fixed effects  -  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effect x preschool  -  Yes  Yes  Yes 
County fixed effects      Yes  Yes 
County fixed effects x preschool      Yes  Yes 
Observations  5128  5128  5128  5128 
Municipalities  287  287  287  287 
R-squared  0.430  0.447  0.517  0.515 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 21 
 
Table A2. Detailed estimates of outsourcing of primary education and preschools to private entities 
Dep. Var: Outsourcing (all providers, share of budget) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Right x PS (βP)  0.615  0.617  0.572**  0.728*** 
  (0.465)  (0.446)  (0.278)  (0.281) 
Votes x PS  0.00266  0.0433  0.0503**  0.0576** 
  (0.0344)  (0.0349)  (0.0217)  (0.0228) 
PS  -26.95**  -22.03*  -27.29***  -24.83*** 
  (12.52)  (11.89)  (6.997)  (6.926) 
Right   0.297  0.301  0.0994  0.134 
  (0.396)  (0.394)  (0.184)  (0.187) 
Votes   0.0163  0.0212  0.0149  0.0103 
  (0.0216)  (0.0235)  (0.0114)  (0.0119) 
Votes x PS x competitive        -24.83*** 
        (6.926) 
Votes x competitive        0.0611** 
        (0.0260) 
Competitive x PS        1.360 
        (1.769) 
Competitive         -3.050** 
        (1.252) 
Employment  -0.0928  -0.110  -0.183***  -0.189*** 
  (0.100)  (0.109)  (0.0564)  (0.0564) 
Business employment  0.0552**  0.581**  0.0748***  0.0757*** 
  (2.277)  (2.459)  (0.0116)  (0.0117) 
Tax base  0.0561***  0.0718**  0.0156  0.0159 
  (0.0139)  (0.0344)  (0.0146)  (0.0144) 
Municipal net profit/loss  2.11e-05  2.41e-05  3.28e-05  3.35e-05 
  (3.54e-05)  (3.66e-05)  (3.25e-05)  (3.24e-05) 
Grants  0.000190***  0.000233***  0.000128***  0.000132*** 
  (5.55e-05)  (6.56e-05)  (4.47e-05)  (4.47e-05) 
University education (3>= years)  0.106  0.0713  0.134***  0.140*** 
  (0.0960)  (0.0997)  (0.0447)  (0.0453) 
Preschool children (<7 years, percent)  -0.0782  -0.114  -0.289**  -0.308** 
  (0.214)  (0.289)  (0.147)  (0.147) 
School age children (7 to 16, percent)  -0.126  -0.199  -0.165  -0.164 
  (0.225)  (0.256)  (0.110)  (0.110) 
Old (>=65 years)  -0.0751  -0.123  -0.116*  -0.124* 
  (0.128)  (0.124)  (0.0668)  (0.0669) 
Foreign citizens  -0.104*  -0.119**  -0.186***  -0.189*** 
  (0.0551)  (0.0561)  (0.0305)  (0.0306) 
On welfare  0.0931  0.0773  -0.0687  -0.0770 
  (0.132)  (0.129)  (0.0670)  (0.0670) 
Interactions with preschool dummy         
         
Employment  -0.273*  -0.357**  -0.223**  -0.216** 
  (0.143)  (0.153)  (0.106)  (0.105) 
Business employment  0.476  0.772**  0.0861***  0.0896*** 
  (3.359)  (3.608)  (0.0260)  (0.0260) 
Tax base  0.0212  0.173***  0.118***  0.107*** 
  (0.0190)  (0.0537)  (0.0326)  (0.0321) 
Municipal profit/loss  -3.63e-05  -4.68e-06  -2.14e-05  -2.30e-05 
  (4.73e-05)  (4.43e-05)  (5.99e-05)  (5.96e-05) 
Grants  -0.000273***  0.000145  -4.87e-05  -4.26e-05 
  (8.06e-05)  (0.000102)  (7.69e-05)  (7.71e-05) 
University education (3>= years)  0.507***  0.226*  0.246***  0.276*** 
  (0.145)  (0.133)  (0.0811)  (0.0818) 
Preschool children (<7 years, percent)  1.712***  1.172**  1.276***  1.225*** 
  (0.368)  (0.502)  (0.276)  (0.273) 
School age children (7 to 16, percent)  0.490*  -0.0704  0.200  0.160 
  (0.279)  (0.296)  (0.199)  (0.196) 
Old (>=65 years)  0.550***  0.149  0.392***  0.349*** 
  (0.209)  (0.199)  (0.114)  (0.112) 
Foreign citizens  0.148**  0.0417  0.0359  0.0198 
  (0.0670)  (0.0663)  (0.0483)  (0.0493) 
On welfare  0.146  -0.0190  0.253**  0.215** 
  (0.155)  (0.145)  (0.107)  (0.107) 
Constant  -0.941  0.0713  7.511*  8.071* 
  (7.595)  (7.674)  (4.198)  (4.203) 
Year fixed effects  -  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effect x preschool  -  Yes  Yes  Yes 
County fixed effects      Yes  Yes 
County fixed effects x preschool      Yes  Yes 
Observations  5120  5120  5120  5120 
Municipalities  287  287  287  287 
R-squared  0.317  0.356  0.676  0.666 
Robust standard errors clustered on municipality in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A3. Outsourcing of preschools and primary schools using left preferences  
Dep. var: Outsourcing (all providers, share of budget) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Left x Pre (βP)  -0.544  -0.663**  -0.862***  -1.032*** 
  (0.348)  (0.333)  (0.332)  (0.344) 
Votes x Pre (γP)  -0.0698***  -0.107***  -0.109***  -0.105*** 
  (0.0193)  (0.0214)  (0.0221)  (0.0226) 
Pre  -42.15***  -37.34***  -30.70***  -30.01*** 
  (7.769)  (7.530)  (8.762)  (8.732) 
Left  -0.442**  -0.497**  -0.291  -0.213 
  (0.220)  (0.222)  (0.218)  (0.223) 
Votes  (for the left bloc)  0.00305  -0.000708  0.0144  0.0174 
  (0.0120)  (0.0128)  (0.0127)  (0.0129) 
Votes x Pre x competitive        -0.0307 
        (0.0493) 
Votes x competitive        -0.0552* 
        (0.0291) 
Competitive x Pre        0.896 
        (2.194) 
Competitive         2.674** 
        (1.297) 
Constant  0.280  1.263  9.820*  9.238* 
  (4.546)  (4.619)  (5.461)  (5.468) 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Controls xPre  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  -  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effect x Pre  -  Yes  Yes  Yes 
County fixed effects      Yes  Yes 
County fixed effects x Pre      Yes  Yes 
Observations  5128  5128  5128  5128 
Municipalities  287  287  287  287 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix B.  Description of variables 
Table B1. Description of variables. 
Variable name  Description 
Out  Outsourcing of preschools or primary education as share of total costs for that service. 
Percent. In the main specifications (Table 3) it refers to outsourcing to all providers. In 
Table 4 it refers to outsourcing to private companies. 
Right 
 
Dummy that equals 1 if the parties in the right bloc hold a majority of the seats in the 
municipal council. 
Votes 
 
Votes for the parties in the right bloc within the municipality in the county election. 
Percent. 
Preschool 
 
Dummy that equals 1 for preschool services and zero for primary education. 
Comp 
 
Competitive election. Dummy that equals 1 if the parties in the right bloc obtained 45 to 55 
percent of the votes in the municipal election. 
Employment  Employed as share of population. Percent 
Business 
employment 
Private sector employment as a share of total employment. Percent 
Tax base  Taxable labor income. Unit: Kronor per capita. 
Municipal net 
profit/loss 
Municipal net profit. Unit: Kronor per capita. 
Grants  General and cost equalizing grants from the national government. Unit: Kronor per capita. 
University 
education  
Share of population with a university degree equivalent to three or more years of study. 
Percent. 
Preschool children   Share of population that is six years old or younger. Percent. 
School age children   Share of population that is between seven and sixteen years old. Percent. 
Old   Share of population that is 65 years or older. Percent. 
Foreign citizens  Share of population who are not Swedish citizens. Percent. 
On welfare  Share of population that receives public subsistence supports. Percent. 
Sources: Statistics Sweden. 
 
 
 